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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-4495 
________________ 
 
CHHYUMI GURUNG, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent 
 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
(No. A087-785-255) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 20, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed : November 17, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION*   
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Chhyumi Gurung petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s order of removal.  For the following reasons, 
we deny the petition. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Gurung was born in 1989 in Nepal to Tibetan parents.  In 2008, she was arrested 
three times at pro-Tibet rallies.  Each time, she alleges, Nepali police interrogated and 
beat her before releasing her after between half a day and two days’ detention.  In 
January 2009, Gurung fled to the United States, entering with a Nepali passport and a 
student visa.  In November of that year, she applied for asylum, claiming that she was a 
stateless Tibetan refugee.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) sought her 
removal, and Gurung moved for withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The IJ found that 
Gurung was a citizen of Nepal because of her passport and because she did not have a 
Tibetan “Green Book,” a passport-like document issued to many Tibetan refugees.  
Though Gurung established a likelihood of torture and persecution on the basis of her 
political opinions if she were removed to China, this was not true if Gurung were 
removed to Nepal.  The IJ therefore denied Gurung’s application for asylum and granted 
withholding of removal as to China only.  The BIA affirmed, and Gurung petitions our 
Court for review. 
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Reivew 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); the BIA had jurisdiction under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)–(6).  Where, as here, the BIA issues a reasoned opinion, we 
review that and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the BIA defers to it.  Huang v. 
Attorney Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). 
We will not disturb the findings of fact that underpin the BIA’s decision if “they 
are supported by substantial evidence from the record considered as a whole, and we will 
reverse based on a factual error only if any reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to 
conclude otherwise.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We review the 
BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, but we accord deference to its reasonable 
interpretations of immigration laws.  Id. 
III. Discussion 
Gurung argues: (1) the IJ denied her due process of law in considering her Nepali 
passport; (2) the finding that she is a citizen of Nepal is unsupported by substantial 
evidence; (3) the IJ failed to consider whether she had offered a “satisfactory 
explanation” for her lack of a Green Book, Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 551 (3d 
Cir. 2001); and (4) she established past persecution and a likelihood of future 
persecution, entitling her to asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. 
 A. Due Process 
At Gurung’s asylum and removal hearing, the IJ informed the parties that it would 
be useful for her to consider the passport Gurung used to enter the United States, and she 
admitted Gurung’s passport into evidence after the record was shut and the parties had 
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made their closing arguments.  Gurung contends that the request for the passport (1) 
amounted to advocacy on the Government’s behalf and (2) that admitting the passport 
late deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to contest its relevance to her claimed 
statelessness, both in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The IJ did not advocate for the Government when she asked DHS to serve the 
passport on Gurung and enter it into the record.  As the BIA held, the IJ “has broad 
discretion to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit and consider 
relevant and probative evidence.”  J.A. 4 (BIA decision) (collecting citations).  In 
exercising her duty to manage Gurung’s case, the IJ sensibly identified the passport as 
important evidence to consider.  She acted as a responsible judge should, directing the 
proceedings before her in such a way as to resolve the parties’ dispute.  Her request for 
the passport cannot reasonably be construed as advocacy, especially in comparison with 
cases where we have found this kind of due process violation.  See, e.g., Fiadjoe v. 
Attorney Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing IJ for taking over direct and 
cross-examination of prospective deportee in an “extraordinarily abusive” tone).  
 As for the timing of the passport’s admission into evidence, Gurung points to no 
procedural rule the IJ violated by allowing its late admission into the record.  Indeed, 
“[t]he Immigration Judge may set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and 
related documents and responses thereto, if any.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (emphasis 
added).  And Gurung had an opportunity to object; she filed written objections contesting 
the passport’s admissibility, which the IJ overruled.  Gurung offers no reason why the 
hearing would have proceeded differently had DHS offered the passport earlier.  It was 
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competent evidence tending to prove her citizenship, a highly relevant consideration, as 
she based her asylum application in part on the allegation that she is stateless.  Because 
the IJ allowed Gurung to object (and Gurung does not challenge the IJ’s consideration of 
or ruling on her objections), she was afforded “‘the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’” on the subject of the passport, and 
therefore her due process claim fails.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). 
 B. Gurung’s Nepali Citizenship 
Gurung argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the IJ and BIA’s 
conclusions that she is a citizen of Nepal because her passport is not genuine.  The only 
material in the record in favor of Gurung’s position is her own testimony that she 
fraudulently obtained the document.  But Gurung was born in Nepal and lived there for 
more than 15 years, and it is undisputed that these criteria make her eligible for Nepali 
citizenship.  She was admitted to the United States in reliance on her passport, further 
supporting the inference that it is genuine.  In the end, she did not establish citizenship in 
a country other than Nepal, and she could not produce a Tibetan Green Book, which 
would have corroborated her claim that she was a stateless Tibetan refugee.  The BIA and 
IJ were entitled to weigh this countervailing evidence and conclude that Gurung’s 
passport was genuine, and their conclusions are therefore supported by substantial 
evidence.1 
                                              
1 We note that the basis for Gurung’s removal is that she entered the United States 
without a valid passport.  But as Gurung has never pointed out this tension in the IJ’s 
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 C. The IJ’s Application of Abdulai 
In both asylum and withholding of removal proceedings, “[t]he testimony of the 
applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without 
corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), 16(b) (emphasis added).  There are also times when 
such credible testimony is not sufficient.  In these cases, the BIA requires of the IJ: “(1) 
an identification of the facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an 
inquiry as to whether the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant 
facts; and, if he or she has not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately 
explained his or her failure to do so,” a framework we have endorsed.  Abdulai, 239 F.3d 
at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The IJ specified Gurung’s identity and 
nationality as facts requiring corroboration, and Gurung was unable to produce a Tibetan 
Green Book.  The BIA erred in affirming the IJ, Gurung argues, because the IJ did not 
address the third prong of Abdulai. 
In a section of her opinion headed “No Green Book,” the IJ acknowledged that 
Gurung applied for such a document in 2007, 2008, and 2009, and she noted the 
argument that Gurung was approved for one but never received it due it bureaucratic 
delays.  The IJ addressed other evidence that Gurung amassed to support her claimed  
refugee status, namely letters from the Office of Tibet (the Tibetan government-in-exile’s 
representative in New York) and the Nechung Foundation (a New York nonprofit), and a 
card from the Tibetan Youth Congress of New York and New Jersey.  The IJ determined 
                                                                                                                                                  
reasoning, we do not consider it.  See Castro v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 671 F.3d 356, 365 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
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that the letters were problems because they both referred to Gurung’s Green Book, a 
document Gurung acknowledges has never been issued, and that the card had limited 
probative value because Gurung received it after applying for asylum.  The IJ thus 
dismissed all of Gurung’s explanations for why she had no Green Book despite being a 
Tibetan refugee.  From her detailed discussion, it is evident that the IJ in substance 
analyzed whether Gurung adequately explained her failure to produce the Green Book 
and concluded she had not, even if the decision did not parrot the language of Abdulai.  
 D. Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
A person may receive asylum if she has suffered past persecution or has a 
reasonable fear of future persecution.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).  Past persecution triggers a 
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Singh v. Gonzales, 
406 F.3d 191, 195–96 (3d Cir. 2005).  To be entitled to mandatory withholding of 
removal under the INA, a prospective deportee must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence (a higher standard than asylum requires) that she will be persecuted upon 
removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  Similarly, if a person can show that it is more likely 
than not that she will be tortured if sent to a particular country, the CAT forbids removal 
to that place.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).   
“Persecution,” we have held, “does not encompass all treatment that our society 
regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 
329 F.3d 157, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  An 
instructive case on the border between persecution that requires withholding of removal 
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and unjust treatment that does not is Jarbough v. Attorney Gen., 483 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 
2007).  In that case, the first time he was arrested  
officers placed Jarbough in an interrogation room for four hours. They threatened 
him with wires and electrical cables, screamed at him, and jabbed his shoulder 
with their fists. The second time, the officers confined Jarbough for two days. 
They cursed, threatened, kicked, shoved, and pushed him. As a result of this 
abuse, Jarbough suffered bruising. He did not go to a doctor, however, as his 
injuries did not require immediate medical intervention.  
 
Id. at 191.  We held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that 
Jarbough had not suffered persecution.   
Other than conclusory statements and generalized references to “background 
documents . . . in the record,” Pet’r’s Br. 32–34, the only evidence Gurung relies on to 
support her claim that she will be persecuted or tortured is the series of detentions by 
Nepali police in 2008.  Between March and August of that year, she was arrested, 
detained, interrogated and beaten three times.  During the last two detentions, she was 
threatened with deportation to China.  None of the episodes lasted more than two days, 
and none required medical attention.  Authorities never pursued deportation, and Gurung 
remained in Nepal months after her last arrest without incident.   
Although the behavior of the police appears deplorable, we must deny Gurung’s 
petition.  Her treatment was no worse than that suffered by Jarbough.  Like him, Gurung 
alleged minor injuries that did not require medical intervention.  Her longest detention 
lasted two days, just as in Jarbough.  Moreover, although she remained in Nepal for some 
months after her last arrest, she points to no evidence that she was harassed after August 
2008.  The IJ characterized the testimony before her—including Gurung’s—as “vague 
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. . . about the circumstances of the three arrests and what exactly was happening at that 
moment.”  App. 15 (IJ decision).  Gurung has come forward with no additional clarity on 
appeal.  By virtue of our precedents, particularly Jarbough, and our deferential standard 
of review, we must hold that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the 
police in Nepal did not “persecute” Gurung within the meaning of our case law. 
Finally, because Gurung does not meaningfully challenge the BIA’s finding with 
respect to future persecution or torture except insofar as the BIA and IJ did not apply a 
presumption in Gurung’s favor based on past persecution, we cannot grant her petition on 
this ground either. 
* * * * * 
For these reasons, we deny Gurung’s petition for review. 
 
